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IS IT RATIONAL TO ASSUME
RATIONALITY IN BUSINESS?
The author challenges a basic concept underlying the workings of business; perhaps
you, too, will wonder about some of your business decisions—and about some of the
financial statements you prepare or read.
Ula K. Motekat, CPA
Amherst, Massachusetts

goes on in economics textbooks (and will ap
pear on the next examination) even if it is not
applicable to the real world of General Motors,
U.S. Steel, and IBM.
The beginning business student is usually
not that fortunate. He is rarely told that most
disciplines in the business college assume ra
tionality on the part of business—and he is
seldom, if ever, asked to think about the con
sequences of removing that assumption.
What basis is there for assuming rationality
in business? What happens if that assumption
is removed?

The beginning student of economic theory
is usually completely bewildered when he is
told to assume perfect competition. For, in
economics, it means perfect knowledge of the
market by everybody, innumerable buyers and
sellers, and complete substitutability of pro
ducts.
If he is the questioning type, he might ask
himself whether Mustangs, Cougars, and Bar
racudas can be substituted for one another.
After all, they are all animals. But if the com
mercials are correct, the similarity ends right
there and substitutability goes out the power
window.
The innumerable buyers do not present a
problem (at least not to the student who deals
with them only in the abstract), since there are
millions of animal lovers and car buyers. But
innumerable sellers?—that is too ridiculous to
be contemplated, even by a beginning eco
nomics student, for doesn’t Detroit have a
corner on the market?
And perfect knowledge? No one could stay
in his right mind if he visited all the pet shops
(and car dealers) in town without a detour to
his friendly psychiatrist.
Just when the economics student has come
to the conclusion that the ivy-covered econ
prof has turned off and dropped out, he is told
that perfect competition is, alas, virtually non
existent in America. It is, however and never
theless, useful for the model building that

Is the Investor Rational?
A very obvious example to illustrate the
student’s dilemma is the stock market. Numer
ous finance textbooks devote many pages to
the various rational methods of arriving at the
value of a share of common stock (in an al
most perfectly competitive market, as the
economics professor was happy to point out).
Prominent among these methods are the more
or less incomprehensible equations which, due
to the profusion of sigma and delta symbols,
are all Greek to the student. In this rational
stock market, the value of one common share
is equal to all sorts of fractions which do—or
do not—include, either above or below the
dividing line, dividends per share, earnings
per share (both primary and fully diluted),
market capitalization rates, and growth factors
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—some of them being present actual figures,
others representing future expected figures.
The one thing most of these model builders
agree on is that stock market prices will rise,
resulting in capital gains to the stockholders,
if profits are retained and earn at least the
same rate of return as last year’s net assets.
In simple statistical terms, this means that
a positive correlation exists between book value
and Wall Street’s stock market quotation. And
that, of course, is great news for the accoun
tant!!
But abstract model building is one thing,
economic reality is another. To bridge the gap
between the two, many studies have been con
ducted to discover the correlation between
actual stock prices and the researcher’s pet
formula. Several textbooks even go so far as to
mention specifically that the rational investor
should be indifferent as to whether the com
pany’s earnings are retained or paid out in
dividends—assuming either no income taxes
or identical tax rates for dividends and capital
gains. But when this assumption is lifted (and
that does happen every so often) and the
existing higher ordinary income rates on divi
dends are included in the analysis, the in
escapable conclusion is that the rational in
vestor should definitely prefer retained to
distributed earnings.
An arithmetical example can illustrate this
line of reasoning—if a company retains one
dollar of earnings and increases net income by
seven cents, it realizes 7% on its investment, a
fairly easy accomplishment for all but perfectly
competitive enterprises. If the dollar is paid
out in dividends and the stockholder is in the
30% bracket, he has only seventy cents left
after taxes (ignoring the cost of hiring a psy
chiatrist or a CPA, depending on whether he
does or does not prepare his own tax return).
To get the same seven cent return, he must
invest his seventy cents at 10%, a feat that
might prove difficult even for somebody in the
30% bracket on a joint return. Given the lower
capital gains rates, retained earnings have an
other advantage in the rational world of the
finance textbooks—since the dollar of retained
earnings increases the value of the stock by
one dollar—according to most mathematical
formulas—the investor will keep 750 of that
dollar when he sells his stock and pays his
capital gains tax of 25%. So retained earnings
have two advantages: they save the investor’s
time in looking for profitable investments for
his dividends and they save him money when
he does sell his stock holdings. All this happens
in a rational stock market among rational in
vestors!

But what happens in the real world? The
investor prefers dividends! In an often-cited
study Oskar Harkavy1 came to the conclusion
that, other things being equal, the firm paying
dividends enjoys a higher market price of its
stock and a higher price-earnings ratio than
the retentive firm. Cottle and Whitman found
in their study of the relationship between
earnings and market prices2 that, from 1947 to
1955, rising stock prices were due to increases
in the price-earnings ratios which were in
fluenced by higher dividend payout rates,
rather than by higher earnings. And lately
there is a rumor that a good financial relations
consultant can do wonders for the price-earn
ings ratio. One such miracle worker takes
credit for increasing a client’s price from nine
to fifteen times earnings.3
In spite of this evidence that the real-life
investor prefers dividends to retained earnings,
the finance textbooks and journals have not
relegated the rational investor to the footnotes
and the appendices. On the contrary, they look
for logical reasons for his preference for divi
dends. (Fortunately they do not stoop to rescu
ing their equations with the aid of the old
cliche that women—who do own a lot of stock
—are “naturally” illogical and irrational. And
three cheers for them!) In their search for
rationality in investor behavior they apparently
remembered the “information content” of the
Federal Reserve Bank's discount rate (which
crops up in the money and banking textbooks),
so they reasoned that dividends, too, must have
an “information content.” In their thinking, a
cash dividend tells the investor that the com
pany did, indeed, make a profit and has, in
fact, neatly bundled stacks of greenbacks sitting
in the bank vault. This means that a check for
50¢ is more convincing than the CPA’s opinion
on the financial statements with their million
dollar cash balance and billion dollar profit.
The inescapable conclusion is that either the
CPAs have botched their public relations job—
or the investor is not rational.
In view of the above (and because the
author is a CPA), it does not seem logical to
assume rational behavior on the part of the in
vestor. In fact, the assumption of irrationality
may be much more rational. Some investors
use charts—the athletic ones wave their pen
1 Oskar Harkavy, “The Relationship Between Re
tained Earnings and Common Stock Prices,” THE
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Vol. 8 (September
1953), pp. 283-297.
2 Sidney Cottle and Tate Whitman, Corporate
Earning Power and Market Valuation 1935-1955
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), p. 49.
3 “The Art of Blocking That Take-Over,” NEWS
WEEK (December 16, 1968), p. 85.
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an asset constitutes its market price, whatever
that is. Market price, to be valid, has to go
back to beginning economics and the assump
tion of perfect competition. In that happy
world of Adam Smith, no seller can ask a high
er price because no buyer would pay it since
he has perfect knowledge and knows therefore
what “the” market price really is. That, ob
viously, is not the case in the American
economy.
It is manifestly impossible to establish “the”
market price of a pack of Brand X cigarettes.
It varies from the 40¢ charged by the chain
supermarkets, via the 60¢ asked by the special
ity cigar store in the swank downtown hotel,
to the $1.50 appearing on the bill from the
Playboy Club. If there are several prices for a
pack of cigarettes, is it rational to assume just
one market price for a desk, an adding ma
chine, or a wastepaper basket? The significance
of the undepreciated balance of fixed assets in
the balance sheet and the depreciation expense
in the income statement is certainly impaired
if it is admitted that the office furniture could
have been bought at bargain basement prices
or from an old customer who needed the order
but charged a little more.
Hardly less important than the cost concept
is the idea of an asset. A generally acceptable
definition is advanced by Sprouse and Moonitz
who state that assets are “expected future eco
nomic benefits, rights to which have been ac
quired by the enterprise as a result of some
current or past transaction.”5
Under this definition an oil well, a share of
IBM, and the company’s Barracuda all qualify
as assets. And so does a patent. But what is the
difference in future economic benefits between
an invention coming out of some far-away ivory
tower and one developed in the company’s own
laboratory as long as they both confer exclusive
rights to that proverbial better mousetrap?
Surely, the difference in patents is caused by
the originality of their ideas (at least, that is
the basis on which the U.S. Patent Office
works), not by their method of acquisition.
But in many company ledgers, the purchased
patent is an asset and the homemade one is an
expense.
Every businessman will agree that the major
reason for employing bearded geniuses and
subsidizing “Marcus Welby, M.D.” or “The
Tonight Show” is the improvement of future
earnings. Yet, generally acceptable accounting
principles sanction expensing these outlays

nants and Hags, while the sporty types chase
after double tops and double bottoms. Others
use a hot tip from the barber who just shaved
Mr. Gillette, a whisper from the bartender who
just served Mr. Seagram, an operation (surgical
or otherwise) in the White House, or simply
the “bigger fool theory.” That well-known
theory states that there will hopefully be a
bigger fool to buy the stock at a higher price
in the future. And that goes right to the heart
of accounting.

Is the Accountant Rational?
Is it rational to assume that investors use
published financial statements to make invest
ment decisions? Accountants seem to assume
that investors do—they never tire of cautioning
statement readers against placing too much
emphasis on that one “net income” figure. It is,
after all, based on estimates and assumptions.
The estimates most frequently mentioned are
the useful lives of long-lived assets and the
collectibility of receivables. The assumptions
most often stated are the “going concern” and
the “stable dollar.” But does anybody ever
voice the assumption of rationality?
What happens to accounting if it is assumed
that business is not rational? The first notion
to come under suspicion is the “cost” concept,
a fundamental idea in accounting. Cost is so
popular because it is objective, according to
professional opinion. Its objectivity seems to
rest solely on the fact that two people (or two
hundred for that matter) can look at the same
invoice and the check in payment for it and
agree that this amount is indeed what was paid
for the asset or service and is, therefore, its cost.
But how valid is the “cost” of an asset if it is
assumed that whoever purchased it acted ir
rationally? Maybe the purchaser bought from
AT&T (Acme Tambourine and Trampoline)
because its salesman has been buying him
martinis for years with nary an order (and
wining and dining prospective customers must
increase sales, otherwise the rational-acting
sales department would do away with expense
allowances). Or perhaps he bought from them
because a neighbor, golf partner, or friend
works for it, so it has to be a good firm. Or,
simpler yet, that was the first company his
fingers came to when they walked through the
yellow pages.
The objectivity of cost rests also on the as
sumption that cost equals fair market value, as
Curtis Stanley points out in his persuasive
argument.4 In other words, the amount paid for

5 Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, A
Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for
Business Enterprises (New York: AICPA, 1962),
p. 8.

4 Curtis H. Stanley, “Cost-Basis Valuations in
Transactions Between Entities,” THE ACCOUNT
ING REVIEW (July 1964), pp. 639-647.
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people resenting the flood of junk mail? Or
whether the capital asset acquired, a decision
based on many 10-column sheets of marginal
cost analysis prepared by the accounting de
partment, was as profitable as had been es
timated? (It should be pointed out here that
computations of the profitability of prospective
capital outlay occupy vastly more space in ac
counting textbooks than do retrospective com
parisons.)
And how many accountants, owning a share
of Litton or LTV, have questioned whether a
merger (treated either as a pooling or a pur
chase, depending on which one produced the
better-looking financial statements) was under
taken to increase profits or, as Galbraith would
maintain,6 to satisfy management’s desire for
job security and status in the business world?
What all this boils down to is the question—
is it rational to assume rationality in business?
After all, business consists of people. The man
who smokes Brand X cigarettes because you
can’t take the country out of them may be the
purchasing agent. The man who pays 25% in
terest on the installment contract for his color
TV set because everyone in his neighborhood
has one may be the financial vice-president.
And the man who waters and fertilizes his
lawn to make it grow faster so he can spend
more time cutting and cursing it may be the
management efficiency expert. Is it rational
to expect all these people to shed their irra
tional attitudes and to become rational in
dividuals the moment they walk into their
carpeted corner offices and sit down in their
swivel chairs?

when incurred, rather than capitalizing them
as assets. The reason usually given by accoun
tants for this treatment is that it is too difficult
to separate the expenditures that will benefit
the future from the ones that will not (and,
besides, it’s deductible now for tax purposes).
A nonaccountant (and sometimes even an
accountant) could here draw the conclusion
that the criterion for classifying an item as an
asset is its ease of computation. But if that
were so, then rent and utilities would be assets
since they are the easiest things to compute.
By now the thoroughly puzzled nonaccountant
might decide that an asset must possess both
characteristics—it must confer future economic
benefits and it must be easy to compute. And
then, lo and behold, homemade goodwill quali
fies because it does confer future economic
benefits and it is so easy to compute that it
only appears in the intermediate, not the ad
vanced, accounting textbooks.
Digging deeper, below the cost and asset
concepts, one discovers the assumption under
lying all of it. Although rarely expressing it, ac
countants assume that all of a firm’s expendi
tures are made on a rational basis, i.e., to in
crease or maintain profits.
But how many bosses ever try to figure
out whether a cute mini-skirted receptionist at
$25 more than a midi-skirted one contributes
$25 a month more to profits?
Who knows whether a genuine imported
Persian carpet at double (or more) the price
of a domestic nylon rug increases profits? Or
whether executives make better decisions at
solid walnut desks than they do at simple
metal ones?
Does anybody ever sit down and figure out
whether the profits made on orders resulting
from bulk mailings offset the ill will created in

6John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial
State (New York: The New American Library.
Inc., 1968), pp. 181-183.

Today, top management—armed with computers and instantaneous retrieval capability—has to pass
the word as fast as it's obtained, not unlike a classy third baseman must field a bunt—pick up the
ball on a dead run and fire to first base in one smooth motion. No easy trick, to be sure. But there
is a management tool gaining wide acceptance in industry that takes on the characteristic of swift and
smooth communication—the decision room.
In essence, the decision room is a tool to seize and disseminate information to top management in
the quickest and most effective way possible. It is a room different from the conference room because it
is especially designed and equipped to tune in its users to only the important information required in
sound decision making.
Working on the theory that perception is sharpened in direct proportion to the number of human senses
affected, the decision room subliminally stimulates all five senses. In a phase, it manipulates an en
vironment so that those in its realm collectively focus and communicate on only matters brought before
them.
Decision Room—A "Cool" Medium,
Warren Moulds, GENERATION, Vol. 2,
No. 2, November 1969.
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